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International Law Making and Implementation
Voluntary Commitments as Emerging Instruments in
International Environmental Law
by Edith Brown Weiss*
Today we confront a critical environmental challenge:
how to protect the human environment for ourselves and
future generations in the face of our unprecedented capacity
to alter fundamental physical cycles with global and longrange implications for the robustness of our planet.
Scientists observe that we are leaving the stable
Holocene Epoch, embarking on a new geological epoch,
the Anthropocene, in which humans are the major force
for change to the planet.1 There is evidence that the
fundamental carbon and nitrogen cycles are accelerating
significantly, and that the hydrological cycle is speeding
up. The latter can lead to devastating impacts from
more frequent and intense storms, floods and severe
droughts. These developments inherently raise issues of
intergenerational equity.
Environmental law must play an important role in this
emerging epoch. We need environmental law to help ensure
that those living today protect the robustness and integrity
of our planet. We also need it to protect the interests of
future generations so that they can receive a planet no worse
off, on balance, than it was when we received it. This is
a big challenge for a field of law that has had little more
than 40 years in which to develop.
This challenge is taking place within the context
of what may be called a kaleidoscopic world. States,
of which there are now more than 195, continue to
have a central role in the international system. But in
addition, thousands of international organisations (intergovernmental and non-governmental), multinational and
national corporations, innumerable networks and informal
or transient groups, a myriad of community groups
and, recently, millions of individuals also participate in
formulating and implementing environmental norms.
Because of developments in information technology,
changes can take place rapidly, and often unexpectedly.
New patterns of interaction emerge.
People communicate regularly by cell phone, Twitter,
Facebook, YouTube, blogs, etc., locally and across the
globe.2 In the first quarter of 2013, Facebook reported
1,110,000,000 users, with Asia accounting for 319 million,
and Europe 269 million.3 The social network VK, a
Cyrillic-based social network, reportedly had about 199
million users as of May 2012.4 Studies report that Twitter
has almost 556 million registered accounts, with an average
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of 58 million tweets per day.5 YouTube, as of June 2012,
tallied more than one billion unique users each month and
globally 25 percent of the video footage that is watched is
coming from mobile devices.6 Blogs are also numerous and
are influential sources of opinion. As of June 2013, data
on top blog-hosting sites provide the following numbers
on blogs and estimates of daily use: Wordpress had 66.7
million blogs, with 382 million daily visitors; Tumblr had
113.7 million blogs with almost 40 million daily visitors;
and LiveJournal had 64.9 million blogs with almost 3.7
million daily visitors.7 These numbers increase monthly.
Google’s blogger (which includes the former blogspot)
does not report the number of blogs that it hosts.
In addition, the number of cell phones in use has grown
dramatically, especially in India, south-east Asia, and
Africa. In India, for example, wireless phone subscriptions
reached 867.02 million in April 2013,8 and in Africa,
mobile phone subscriptions grew from 16.5 million in
2000 to 648.4 million in 2011.9 These data indicate that
information technology is transforming the way that
people interact and the ways in which individuals, ad hoc
groups, and others can influence events and take actions.
Governments have also signed on to the new technology,
with 125 national governments using Twitter, as of July
2012.10
With the new information technology, there are
potentially many more active participants contributing
to shaping the development and implementation of
environmental law. While some of these actors could work
against environmental conservation, there is at the same
time new space for initiatives and for cooperative efforts
that work toward sustainable development. Many may take
the form of voluntary commitments.
Environmental law, which for these purposes references
international environmental law, has a critical role in
this emerging setting of an Anthropocene epoch and a
kaleidoscopic world. Importantly, environmental law
shapes our behaviour. It provides predictability as to
what is expected and thereby contributes to the stability
of political and social systems. At the same time, it can
protect the dignity of individuals in the environment and
foster environmental justice. Environmental law reflects
shared values and articulates rules that reflect them. While
traditionally, international environmental agreements
have reflected such shared values and articulated the
common obligations that penetrated within States, in
the kaleidoscopic world, shared values will also have to
flourish from the bottom up so that actions taken by the
myriad of new actors work toward common ends.
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
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Traditional Ways of Making International
Environmental Law

Historically, States have made international law by
entering into binding agreements, which they are then
required to implement within their countries. Those within
the country are expected to comply with national laws
and regulations implementing the agreement or, in some
countries, directly with the international obligations to
which their governments have agreed. The relationship
between States is horizontal and, within States, hierarchical.
In the decade and a half following the historic United
Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
in 1972, States negotiated an unprecedented number of
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on a diverse
array of subjects. One could speak of “treaty congestion”
as they competed for space in covering related topics
and sometimes needed extensive national administrative
resources to implement them.11 Different secretariats for
different agreements reviewed separate national reports
for each agreement. Even where the required information
for one overlapped with or was the same as that required
for another, the reports were often prepared by different
ministries within the national government. Frequently
it took much less time to negotiate a new multilateral
agreement than to gain the requisite number of States as
Parties in order for the agreement to go into effect.
States, legal scholars and others observed that many
countries that were party to the agreements were often not
in compliance with the obligations in the agreements.12
Compliance for these purposes includes implementation,
compliance with implementing measures, and enforcement
of violations.13 Hence, international attention turned
to strengthening compliance with the binding MEAs.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
developed and published two sets of guidelines: one on
enhancing compliance with MEAs and the other on national
enforcement of violations of national laws implementing
these agreements.14
Since the year 2000, the rate of negotiation of new
MEAs has slowed. While binding agreements continue
to be important, in part because of their provisions for
dispute resolution and for mandating compliance, other
forms of international non-binding legal instruments have
become ever more important, such as declarations, codes
of conduct, international standards and guidelines.

Non-binding Legal Instruments

Non-binding legal instruments, or what is frequently
referred to as “soft law”, have always had a significant place
in international environmental law. By 1992, a list compiled
of binding agreements and non-binding legal instruments
concerned with the environment already included almost
900 items.15 Non-binding legal instruments take many
forms: declarations, charters, codes of conduct, resolutions,
decisions of international inter-governmental organisations,
and guidelines. They set forth norms that States and other
actors are expected, although not required, to respect. In
the past, they have frequently been a first step toward the
later negotiation of binding agreements. For example, the
UNEP London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press

on Chemicals in International Trade, 1987 and amended
in 1989, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and
Use of Pesticides, 1985, laid the basis for a subsequent
binding agreement: the Rotterdam Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade.16
States negotiate non-binding legal instruments for
many reasons. Sometimes they believe it would not be
possible to reach a binding agreement on specific legal
obligations, or to convince their Congress or Parliament
to ratify such an agreement. Such instruments may also
be useful in addressing new problems quickly. They may
provide greater flexibility, so that States may alter strategies
to address the problem more easily. The transaction costs
of negotiating such instruments are usually considerably
less. Especially as diverse new environmental problems
have arisen, which may affect millions of people globally,
non-binding legal instruments can send an important signal
about how States and all of the actors are expected to
behave, and can foster shared values.17
There is considerable literature on the relationship
between so-called “hard” and “soft” law, much of which
suggests that the latter cannot replace the former and indeed
that “soft” law needs support in “hard” law or a “hard”
law framework to be effective. To highlight a few of the
more recent of these works, Shaffer and Pollack provide an
overview of the literature on both forms of law and conclude
that most scholars view soft law as second best and only
useful when hard law is not available. They suggest that
States deliberately use soft law to undermine and change
hard-law rules.18 Guzman and Meyer reject some previous
explanations regarding the choice of soft law, including the
claim that non-binding instruments are necessarily easier to
conclude, and offer their own theories as to why States may
indeed choose soft law over hard law.19 Brummer argues
that, in the global financial sector, soft law is endemic and
necessary.20 Two earlier studies on soft law, sponsored by
the American Society of International Law, looked across
the spectrum of international law to focus on specific cases
of non-binding legal instruments and analyse the reasons
for using them, compliance with them, and their impacts.
The studies generally support the analysis offered earlier as
to the reasons for using them and suggest that compliance
with them may be as favourable under certain conditions
as with binding agreements.21
The development of international law in the Arctic
illustrates the linkages between such so-called soft law
and hard law, namely that non-binding legal instruments
can be effective and may lead to the negotiation of binding
instruments. When concern arose about the Arctic, the
Arctic States signed the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy in 1991, and subsequently adopted the 1993
Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in
the Arctic.22 Although there were loud calls for a binding
agreement at that time, the resulting instrument was nonbinding. In 1996, the seven Arctic States meeting in Ottawa
signed a Declaration establishing the Arctic Council.23
Again, a non-binding instrument established a formal intergovernmental institution. In both cases, the form enabled
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States to reach agreement and to move forward flexibly to
address new challenges in the region.
The Arctic Council created working groups to address
various issues: the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna,
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, Sustainable
Development Working Group, the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme, the Arctic Contaminants Action
Programme and the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness
and Response Working group. Each group created special
environmental protection programmes, such as the
Circumpolar Protected Area Network. Working groups
have also created non-binding legal instruments, such as
the Arctic Oil and Gas Exploration Guidelines, guidelines
on ship operations in the Arctic, and the Alta Declaration
on environmental impact assessment in the Arctic.24 For
the first time, on 15 May 2013, the Arctic countries signed
a new binding agreement: the Agreement on Arctic Marine
Oil Spill Preparedness and Response.25
The Arctic example is
especially useful because
States operating under nonbinding legal instruments
have developed and continue
to initiate a plethora of new
activities to address new
challenges to the Arctic.
Yet, they operate within a
fragmented field of binding
legal agreements that pertain to
the Arctic: the United Nations
Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), 26 the
International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships,27 and the Polar
Bear Treaty.28 Five of the Arctic
States – Canada, Denmark,
Norway, the Russian Federation
and the United States – met
in 2008 and adopted the
Ilulissat Declaration, which
committed the countries to
the existing international legal
framework, particularly to
UNCLOS provisions, and
explicitly noted that they “see
no need to develop a new
comprehensive international
legal regime to govern the Edith Brown Weiss and Helga Haub
Arctic Ocean”.29 This contrasts
with Antarctica, where a comprehensive overall agreement
governs the coverage area30 and preceded the development
of non-binding legal instruments to address various facets
of Antarctic problems.

Voluntary Commitments by States

In international law, States have always possessed
the authority to make voluntary commitments to address
international issues. Each such commitment represents an
exercise of national sovereignty. In practice, States have
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been reluctant to undertake such commitments in the
absence of a commitment by other States to do the same.
Hence, there has been the penchant for binding agreements
or more recently, in the environmental area, for consensus
on non-binding legal instruments. The efforts to address
climate change and to promote environmental sustainability
have led States to make voluntary commitments to control
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and to take measures to promote
sustainability, even in the absence of a non-binding legal
instrument. The commitments of States after the Climate
Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009,
illustrate this.
At the Conference, States negotiated but then declined
to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, by which States would
commit to reducing GHGs. They even declined to approve
it as a Conference document, so that it had no legal
status. Nonetheless, 141 countries have engaged with the
Accord, by being either associated with it or supportive

of it. These countries account for about 87 percent of
global GHG emissions. Eighty-one States have submitted
targets for reducing emissions, with 46 States committing
to specific targets and timetables for reducing quantities
of emissions, seven States committing to reductions from
“business as usual”, two States committing to carbon
intensity reduction, and 26 States submitting action plans
designed to reduce GHG emissions or promote efficiency
but without reduction targets.31 In a few instances, increased
commitments were conditional upon other States also
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
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making specific commitments.32 In the climate meetings
since Copenhagen, States have not renounced these
commitments. To the contrary, at the next climate meeting
in Cancún, Mexico, they built upon the foundation laid in
the Copenhagen Accord.33
In the case of climate, these voluntary commitments take
place within a broader context of binding agreements: the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and, for many, the Kyoto Protocol.34 Indeed, States have
agreed to negotiate a new binding agreement on climate by
2015, to take effect in 2020 for the period beyond 2020.35
Yet the voluntary commitments of Copenhagen represent
the willingness of States to commit to measures even in the
absence not only of a binding agreement, but of consensus
on either a non-binding legal instrument or a formal
conference document. This development may presage other
voluntary commitments by States to address either other
global environmental commons issues or environmental
issues specific to an area, in which the consequences of
not acting are seen as too severe to contemplate.
Voluntary commitments can be especially useful in at
least the following contexts: to press ahead in addressing a
problem in the context of a general binding commitment, to
enable differentiated commitments by States in addressing
problems, or, importantly, to take actions when the dangers
from inaction are too severe to wait for a formal consensus.

Non-binding Legal Instruments and
Voluntary Commitments by Corporate and
Non-governmental Organisations

From an environmental perspective, the global
increase in voluntary commitments by private industry is
a potentially significant development. They may involve an
international accord to which companies voluntarily agree
to commit themselves. One of the most important examples
is the United Nations Global Compact, which sets forth ten
principles, three of which directly concern the environment.
As of December 2013, the Compact had over 10,000
signatories in more than 140 countries, which included the
major companies. In other cases, the instrument involved
was negotiated within the private sector.
The globalisation of corporations and the development
of international supply chains mean that national regulations
are often inadequate and regulation at the international
level is needed. These efforts by private industry are often
linked to inter-governmental organisations, private-sector
networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or
other participants in civil society. They take the form of
standards, guidelines, codes of conduct, best practices,
or similar documents. According to Vogel, “Private
regulations that define standards for ‘responsible’ business
practices now exist for virtually every global industry
and internationally traded commodity, including forestry,
fisheries, chemicals, computers, electronic equipment,
apparel, rugs, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, diamonds, gold,
toys, minerals, mining, energy, tourism, financial services
and athletic equipment”.36 They can take different forms:
principles, standards and certification, self-reporting
of actions, or adoption of certain processes.37 By 2010,
for example, more than 46,000 firms were certified
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press

as compliant with the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard for environmental
management systems.38
NGOs have also developed standards with which
producers are expected to comply and supply their own
system of certification. Fair trade is one example of a wellknown NGO certification initiative, by which consumers
can be informed as to whether a good has been certified as
produced in accordance with specific standards. There are
many fair-trade certified labels, with Fairtrade Labelling
Organizations International (FLO) serving as an umbrella
organisation and maintaining a register of updated
standards.39 There are other important initiatives in forests
and in fisheries.40
The norms that these initiatives encapsulate do not
constitute formal binding agreements, even by the private
sector. Rather they are non-binding measures that have
been formulated by a consensus consisting mostly of
non-State actors, to which the private sector voluntarily
adheres. Initiatives such as Fairtrade and those applying to
fisheries and forests depend upon recognition by consumers
in the marketplace. Conceptually, some of the voluntary
private-sector initiatives share similarities with the nonbinding instruments that governments negotiate in that
they are generally easier to negotiate and provide some
flexibility in implementation, such as through certification
arrangements. When industry self-regulates, the resulting
initiatives are often attractive because they may avoid or
pre-empt actions by governments. Since the instruments
apply to many actors, they may also help to ensure a level
playing field in trade relations, and to provide a basis for
pressuring others to join or to comply. To date, however,
participants in these initiatives often represent only a small
fraction of the industry.

Voluntary Commitments for Sustainability

Voluntary commitments are distinguished from other
legal forms because they are not made pursuant to a
consensus instrument to which the parties have agreed.
They are not negotiated. They are generally independent
of the commitments of other parties, though they may be
in part conditioned upon similar actions by others, as in
several commitments that States filed for the Copenhagen
Accord. They generally provide for specific actions to be
taken within a given time-frame. Ideally, they provide for
measurable results.
A growing number of international initiatives solicit
and publish voluntary commitments by States and nongovernmental entities to sustainable development. Most
have their own registries. Several registries aggregate and
publish commitments from multiple initiatives. The United
Nations is the forum for at least three such initiatives: the UN
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform established
as part of the 2012 Rio+20 preparations;41 the Sustainable
Energy for All initiative established by the UN SecretaryGeneral as part of the 2012 Year of Sustainable Energy to
solicit commitments by governments, businesses and civil
society to take actions to secure global access to sustainable
energy by 2030;42 and the UN Global Compact established
in 2000 to solicit corporate commitments to take specific
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actions to further UN goals.43 Other initiatives in the private
sector relevant to environment include the Clinton Global
Initiative,44 which invites commitments from governments
and non-governmental bodies globally; the Corporate
EcoForum,45 which is a membership organisation of large
companies that publishes commitments to sustainability;
and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Cloud of
Commitments,46 which provides an international registry
that aggregates commitments from various initiatives. The
sites generally do not yet gather data on compliance with
the commitments made.
One of the most significant initiatives of this kind is
the UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform.
In the preparations for the Rio+20 Conference, several
States and NGOs, including the US-based World Resources
Institute, pushed for the creation of a compendium of
commitments to promote sustainable development. As
part of the conference, international organisations, NGOs
and private corporations were invited to make voluntary
commitments to take actions to achieve sustainable
development. More than 700 commitments were collected
during the Conference, which were listed in a new online
registry, the United Nations Sustainable Development
Knowledge Platform.47
The final Report from the Conference, “The Future We
Want”, explicitly endorsed this initiative in paragraph 283:
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We welcome the commitments voluntarily entered
into at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development and throughout 2012 by all stakeholders
and their networks to implement concrete policies,
plans, programmes, projects and actions to promote
sustainable development and poverty eradication.
We invite the Secretary-General to compile these
commitments and facilitate access to other registries
that have compiled commitments, in an Internet-based
registry. The registry should make information about
the commitments fully transparent and accessible to the
public, and it should be periodically updated.48
The UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform
responds to this mandate. The Platform continues to open to
voluntary commitments that meet the criteria “to announce
and achieve concrete time-bound deliverables that advance
sustainable development”. As of early 2013, the Platform
listed 1374 commitments, with an estimated worth of more
than US$ 637 million. This includes 36 commitments by
governments and 128 commitments by major groups of
actors in climate change and energy.49 The Table below lists
the voluntary, non-negotiated commitments by countries
under Rio+20 and associated initiatives related to climate
and energy.

Table 1. Climate-change-related voluntary commitments by countries under international platforms
Country

Platform

Description

Antigua and
Barbuda

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2030, achieve 15% renewable energy
Declaration)

Cape Verde

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, reduce importation of electricity fuel by 30%, and reduce GHG
Declaration)
emissions by 35%; by 2030, become 0% emitting country, and achieve 2%
penetration rate of electric vehicles

Barbados

China
Cook Islands
Dominica
Fiji
Ghana
Grenada
Guyana
Liechtenstein

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2029, achieve 22% electricity energy-efficiency savings relative to “business
Declaration)
as usual” (BAU), and 29% of all electricity from renewable sources

Rio+20

US$ 31.7 million for project to help small island States, least developed
countries, and African countries with climate change

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2015, 50% renewable energy; by 2020, 100% renewable energy
Declaration)

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, become carbon-negative by exporting renewable energy, and increase
Declaration)
renewable energy generation to 100%
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2015, utilisation of biofuels in transport sector
Declaration)
Sustainable Energy By 2020, achieve 10% renewable energy
for All
Rio+20

By 2020, reduce GHG emissions by 20% below BAU (Barbados Declaration);
by 2030, become 100% green in electricity and transport sectors

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2030, develop hydropower to provide 90% of electricity
Declaration)
Rio+20

By 2020, increase share of sustainable energy from 8% to 20%, reduce CO2
emissions by 20% (same as Copenhagen Commitment), and reduce energy
consumption by 20%
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press
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Country

Maldives
Marshall
Islands
Mauritius

Nauru
Samoa
Seychelles
Solomon
Islands
St Lucia

St Vincent
and the
Grenadines

Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
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Platform

Description

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, achieve carbon neutrality in energy sector (same as Copenhagen
Declaration)
Commitment)
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, achieve 20% efficiency improvement in transportation sector fuel use,
Declaration)
20% of energy through indigenous renewable resources, and 40% reduction in
CO2 emissions below 2009 levels (same as Copenhagen Commitment)
Rio+20

By 2025, increase share of renewable energy to 35% (Barbados Declaration);
by 2020, increase forest tree cover, implement reforestation programme, and
extend surveillance of protected areas by 80%

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2015, achieve 50% of energy provided by alternative sources; by 2025, viable
Declaration)
power-generating capacity including alternative renewable energy sources
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2030, increase contribution of renewable energy to total energy by 20%
Declaration)
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2030, 15% of energy supply from renewable energy
Declaration)

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2030, replace current use of imported fossil fuel for electricity by 100%
Declaration)

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, reduce public-sector electricity consumption by 20%, and increase
Declaration)
contribution of renewable energy by 20%

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2012, reduce projected electricity generation by 5%; by 2015, deliver 30% of
Declaration)
electricity output from renewable sources; by 2020, reduce projected electricity
generation by 15%, and deliver 60% of electricity output from renewable sources
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, 50% of power generation from renewable energy
Declaration)

Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, improve efficiency of electricity by 18%, and include 50% renewable
Declaration)
energy in energy transformation sector
Rio+20 (Barbados By 2020, power generation 100% from renewable energy
Declaration)

Prepared by Lydia Slobodian. Source: United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org.
Major corporations have also made commitments
under the various voluntary initiatives referenced above.
These may be more significant than the commitments
made by States. Some of the commitments are from
large multinational corporations, whose revenues eclipse
the economies of some countries. They are in the form
of targets and timetables. Microsoft, for example, has
committed to achieve net zero-carbon emissions by 2013.
The Bank of America has committed US$ 50 billion over
the next 10 years to financing activities that advance a lowcarbon economy. Bridgestone has committed to securing
100 percent of its materials from sustainable sources by
2030. Dell has committed to reducing its GHG emissions
by 40 percent by 2015. SABMiller has committed to
reducing fossil fuel emissions from on-site energy use by
50 percent per hectolitre of lager produced by 2020, relative
to 2008 levels. See the Annex to this article, for a list of
major voluntary commitments by corporations related to
climate and energy.
While these commitments are in themselves significant,
they certainly are not enough to effect a sufficient change
0378-777X/13/$27.50 © 2014 IOS Press

in behaviour to meet the growing need for a globally
sustainable economy. But they do have the potential to
leverage consumer opinion to encourage competitors and
others to make similar commitments. Of course, for this
to happen, the public must know about the commitments
and be willing to respond accordingly.

Voluntary Commitments in a Kaleidoscopic
World

The above analysis addressed voluntary
commitments by major actors in the public and private
sectors. In a kaleidoscopic world, individuals, ad hoc
coalitions, informal groups, transient networks, and
other such actors become important. Their actions
may often be characterised as bottom-up. They may
respond to both immediate issues, which may emerge
and change rapidly, and to longer-term challenges.
And each of them may alter their focus in response to
changing conditions.
Voluntary commitments could have an important role
in bottom-up empowerment. They produce “buy-in” by
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those who make them. If we are to address the momentous
environmental issues confronting us locally and globally,
we need to mobilise everyone to engage in sustainable
development and living patterns. Voluntary commitments
are useful because they do not depend on negotiated
outcomes, can be initiated quickly (at least in theory), and
can be adapted to local practices and culture. They give
actors flexibility, because the party making the commitment
is responsible for specifying its content. Such actions
should be able to draw upon best practices and to showcase
best practices to facilitate learning. Voluntary commitments
can inform others and build a favourable reputation for
those taking them. They can build momentum toward
broader efforts to live sustainably. They can provide space
for cooperative efforts. Such efforts complement, but are
not a substitute for, commitments by States and major
private-sector actors.

Concerns about Voluntary Commitments

While voluntary commitments are becoming an
important feature in the environmental-law landscape,
they also raise significant issues. Such issues will increase
as more actors in the kaleidoscopic world voluntarily take
initiatives and other actions relevant to environmental
law. Some environmental problems, especially global
ones like climate change or marine pollution, require
that States work together to address them and that they
agree upon what needs to be done. They also require that
other actors behave in certain ways. While voluntary
commitments may be an important, perhaps necessary,
step in the face of inaction, they cannot be regarded as a
substitute for negotiated norms and requirements. Indeed
they may, in the long run, depend upon the latter for their
effectiveness.
Voluntary commitments in the private sector rest in
large measure upon the premise that they enhance the
reputation of those making them, although there is little
evidence that such commitments have been reflected in
sales or share prices.50 Scholarly literature on corporate
compliance with regulations also suggests that reputation
is an important factor in motivating compliance. 51
The concern with reputation can be used to encourage
commitments as well as to guard against “green wash” in
the commitments.
One of the most significant problems with voluntary
commitments made in the absence of a negotiated
consensus on the obligation is that they may not be
enunciated in formats that are compatible with each other
or comparable. The qualitative data, for example, may
not be standardised or sufficiently comparable for civil
society, investors and others to use in assessing overall
advancement toward sustainability.
This leads to the issue of monitoring. Since there may be
hundreds or thousands of commitments in different formats
and with different content, it will be challenging to monitor
compliance with each commitment. This will be the case,
even if there is full transparency of commitments and of
reporting on progress in meeting them. Developments in
information technology may improve this situation in the
future.
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Voluminous voluntary commitments also raise
difficult issues of accountability. The traditional view
of accountability is that the party responsible for
carrying out an obligation must be held to account if it
is not carried out. But this requires tracking an actor’s
compliance with its commitment and being able to impose
consequences for not meeting the commitment. None of
the international registries track compliance with voluntary
commitments. Especially in a kaleidoscopic world where
many commitments may not be centrally registered,
accountability can be difficult, and can potentially involve
high transaction costs.
Perhaps most of all, the growing use of voluntary
commitments points to the need for platforms that
compile and aggregate individual commitments and
that make the commitments readily accessible online.
Such platforms can be formed at the local, regional and
international levels, and by civil society organisations as
well as governments. A few integrating platforms should
facilitate our ability to assess the comprehensiveness of
voluntary commitments, to identify significant gaps, and
to encourage cooperation. They also need to provide space
for those making the commitments to report regularly on
their implementation of them, so that it may be possible
to track compliance.

The Importance of Common Values

All of the above rests on having a set of common
values, from which commitments can emerge and
desirable behaviour can be derived. While international
environmental agreements traditionally reflected such
values and articulated shared commitments, which
penetrated hierarchically downward within States for
implementation; in the kaleidoscopic world, the common
values and shared commitments will also need to flourish
from the bottom up. Since individuals, ad hoc coalitions,
and informal or transient groups of actors will increasingly
be able to influence the development and implementation of
international environmental law, common values become
essential. Otherwise, voluntary commitments can be a fig
leaf covering inaction, or can be drastically insufficient to
achieve a sustainable world.
One of the significant features of our information
technology revolution is that individuals increasingly
communicate globally. Indeed, young people are growing
up with an outlook that assumes they can communicate with
others elsewhere. This emerging global linkage provides an
avenue for fostering shared values about the environment
and sustainable development. It could provide a means
for fostering bottom-up commitments and actions that
address our environmental problems and foster sustainable
development.
For international environmental law, the above analysis
suggests that we need to broaden the range of relevant actors
beyond States to encompass those coming to prominence
in the kaleidoscopic world and to consider the modes of
communication. It also suggests that we should take an
expansive view of the range of relevant instruments so as
to include not only the traditional binding and non-binding
legal instruments but also the voluntary commitments that
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all actors may increasingly make and rely upon. Binding
multilateral agreements continue to be important, and States
should continue to pursue them, but they are insufficient
to address our growing and complex environmental issues
effectively. For that, we will need everyone’s assistance.
This requires developing common values that are culturally

sensitive to conserve our environment for present and
future generations.
The author thanks Lydia Slobodian for research
assistance.

Annex

Climate-change-related voluntary commitments by corporations under international platforms
Committer

Accenture

Acumen Fund,
Inc.
Agritech Faso

Aid Green, Ltd
Applied
Materials, Inc.
ArcelorMittal

Platform

Description

Clinton Global
Initiative

Invest US$ 3 million in companies providing renewable energy to poor

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2013, support UN Sustainable Energy for All programme office, and
establish Accenture Development Partnership to support energy access

Sustainable Energy
for All

Construct biomass-to-energy power plant, including five units of 1 MW each

Clinton Global
Initiative

Fund participation of 18 energy entrepreneurs at Santa Clara University training
programme over next three years

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2016, increase carbon-credit-related business to 20% of gross sales

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 8% per tonne of steel produced relative
to 2007

ARM Holdings Sustainable Energy
for All
Artron
Enterprise
Commitments

China Going Green

By 2013, expand engineering personnel by 10% to research energy-efficient
microprocessors, graphics processors, etc., and create collaborative initiatives
to improve energy efficiency
Adopt methods to reduce energy consumption and emissions, and guarantee
materials comply with FSC/COC standards

Asea Brown
Boveri Limited
(ABB)

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2015, ensure energy and resource efficiency of ABB operations improves
by 2.5% per year

Banco
Santander

Global Compact

By 2014, increase purchase of renewable energy from 2.45 million kWh to 3.86
million kWh; by 2013, reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption by 7.5%

Bank of
America

Sustainable Energy
for All

Commit US$ 50 billion over next 10 years to finance activities that advance
the low-carbon economy

Bayer AG

Sustainable Energy
for All

Improve energy efficiency and develop tools and strategies for sustainable
buildings

BASF SE

Beijing
Vantone Real
Estate
BMW Group

Sustainable Energy
for All
China Going Green

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2020, reduce GHG emissions per metric ton of sales product by 40% relative
to 2002, and improve energy efficiency in production by 35% relative to 2002
Ensure residential projects comply with Green Product standard and all
commercial projects with Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) standards; allocate 0.5% of profits to environmental product
development; five-year plan to reduce carbon emissions by 2.45 million tons
By 2020, reduce resource consumption per vehicle by 45% (relative to 2006),
and reduce product CO2 emissions by 50% (relative to 1995)

Bridgestone

Global Compact

100% sustainable materials by 2030

Brisa AutoEstradas de
Portugal, S.A.

Global Compact

By 2012, decrease electricity consumption by 10% (relative to 2009), decrease
fuel consumption by 3%, decrease water consumption by 3%, decrease waste
generation by 3%, and decrease GHG emissions by 6%
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Platform

Description

China
Petroleum
and Chemical
Corporation

Global Compact

By 2015, reduce SO2 emissions by 12%, COD by 12%, NHx by 10%, and
NOx by 10%

Cementos
Argos S.A.

Global Compact

China Vanke

China Going Green

Citigroup

Clinton Global
Initiative

CLP Holdings
Limited

d.light design
Dell
Deloitte LLP
Det Norske
Veritas

Sustainable Energy
for All

By end of 2012, achieve garbage reduction of 30–40%; new residential buildings
use 87% wood, 20% less energy, 63% lower water costs, green-star standards,
and FSC-certified wood
Develop and offer energy-efficiency finance solutions

By 2020, achieve 20% renewable energy, 30% non-carbon-emitting energy,
reduce carbon intensity of generating portfolio to 0.6kg CO2/kWh from 0.84
CO2/kWh in 2007 (28% reduction); by 2035, reduce carbon intensity of
generating portfolio to 0.45 kg CO2/kWh (45% reduction); by 2050, reduce
carbon intensity of generating portfolio to 0.2 kg CO2/kWh (75% reduction)

Sustainable Energy
for All

Expand production and distribution of solar lamps

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2021, reduce GHGs by 35% per full-time equivalent (FTE) relative to 2011

Global Compact

Global Compact

DGB Financial
Group

Sustainable Energy
for All

Dupont

Sustainable Energy
for All

Disney

By 2022, reduce CO2 emissions per ton by 20%, and substitute 7.5% of fossil
fuels with alternative fuels

Corporate
EcoForum

By 2015, reduce GHG emissions by 40%, and increase cumulative take-back
volume to 1 billion pounds
By 2012, reinvest 6% of revenue in development of sustainable technology
including low carbon
By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 10% relative to 2008, and reduce energy
consumption by 1% every year

By 2015, fund 6,000 acres of reforestation including one project that results in
enhancing carbon sequestration

By 2020, reduce non-renewable energy use by 10% per dollar revenue relative
to 2010; by 2015, reduce by 3%; by 2015, increase revenue from products that
reduce GHGs or increase energy efficiency by US$ 2 billion

Eaton
Corporation

Sustainable Energy
for All

Embraco

Sustainable Energy
for All

Invest 3% of revenue in research in increasing energy-efficiency levels in
refrigerator compressors

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2015, reduce GHG emissions per k of hydrocarbon production by 40%
compared to 2010

Ecodes

EnerNOC
Eni
Entergy
Eskom
Holdings

Femsa

GDF SUEZ

Rio+20

Clinton Global
Initiative

Sustainable Energy
for All

Sustainable Energy
for All
Sustainable Energy
for All
Global Compact

By 2015, reduce water used by 20% relative to 2010, and reduce GHG emissions
by 25% relative to 2012
Reduce CO2 emissions per capita by 20% relative to 2010

Adopt Green Button standard to provide consumers with information about
their energy use

By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions from power plants and purchases to 20%
below 2000 levels

By 2016, increase thermal plant efficiency by 150 MW; by 2017, reduce internal
energy consumption by 15%
By 2013, use renewable energy for 85% of energy needs of Mexican operations
(based on size of operations in 2010)

By 2017, increase activities in energy efficiency by 40%; by 2015, increase
renewable energy capacity by 50%; by 2015, develop biodiversity action plan
at each sensitive site in the European Union (EU)
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Platform

Description

Green
Mountain
College

Global
Compact
Network
Pakistan

Global Compact

Clinton Global
Initiative

By 2013, reduce carbon footprint by 66% relative to 2007 levels

Henkel AG,
Co. KGAA

Sustainable Energy
for All

Himin Solar

China Going Green

By 2030, triple value created for footprint; by 2015, reduce energy per
production unit by 15%, reduce water per production unit by 15%, and increase
sales per production unit by 10%

Hitachi

Sustainable Energy
for All

Holcim Group
Infosys
ItalCementi
Group

ITC Limited

Sustainable Energy
for All

Sustainable Energy
for All
Sustainable Energy
for All
Global Compact

Johnson
Controls

Clinton Global
Initiative

Lafarge

Sustainable Energy
for All

KPMG
International

Sustainable Energy
for All

Marriott
International

Corporate
EcoForum

Masdar

Sustainable Energy
for All

Marriott; OPIC

MeadWestvaco
Metsä Group
Microsoft
Mitsubishi
Chemical
Holdings
Corporation

National
Confederation
of Hellenic
Commerce

Rio+20

By 2017, achieve 20% reduction in energy use, and compliance with Euro 2
low-emission standards in vehicles

Achieve 40% utilisation rate of renewable energy, 30% reduction of carbon
emissions, 90% utilisation rate of rain water, 70% sewage recycling, 80%
recycling of engineering waste, and 80% recycling of construction waste
By 2025, help reduce CO2 emissions by 100 million tons relative to 2005
through Hitachi products and services

By 2015, reduce average specific net CO2 emissions (kgCO2/tonne cementitious
materials) by 25% relative to 1990

Reduce consumption by 50%, source 100% of electricity from renewables,
and become carbon neutral
By 2015, have 10% of thermal energy demand for cement production from
alternative fuels and biomass

By 2017, retain status as carbon-positive, water-positive despite growth in
business
Adopt Green Button standard to provide consumers with information about
their energy use
By 2015, seek to reduce GHG emissions per FTE by 15% (relative to 2010)

By 2020, use 50% alternative fuels in all entities Lafarge controls, reduce CO2
emissions by 33% (relative to 1990 levels), and, by 2015, contribute to 500
energy-efficient construction projects

In Amazon’s Juma Basin, achieve 20% reduction in energy and water
consumption by 2020; US$ 500,000 in 2012
Commit US$ 2,000,000 to build hotels meeting environmental standards such
as LEED
Install 500kWp photovoltaic plant in Tonga by 2013

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2015, reduce use of fossil fuels by 25%

Sustainable Energy
for All

Achieve net zero-carbon emissions by 2013

Global Compact

By 2020, source all wood from sustainably managed forests, reduce fossil
CO2 emissions in production by 30%, and improve energy efficiency by 10%

Global Compact

By 2015, reduce GHGs by 17% in Japan from 2005

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2014, achieve 7% reduction in operational carbon footprint across 700 SMEs
of the retail sector (relative to 2012)
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Committer

Platform

Description

Sustainable Energy
for All

Achieve 20% reduction in CO2 emissions per unit from FY11 levels through
FY15

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2014, improve environmental management efficiency in gas business by
26% over 2009 levels

Global Compact

From 2012, offer free or reduced rate communications services for sustainable
projects and organisations within Switzerland equalling 10% of annual turnover

National
Ready Mixed
Concrete
Association

2030 Challenge for
Products

Nokero
International
Ltd

Sustainable Energy
for All

Nike, Inc.

Osaka Gas
Philips
Polarstem

Sustainable Energy
for All

Procter and
Gamble

Global Compact

Quanta
Computer

China Going Green

Rezidor Hotel
Group

Sustainable Energy
for All

SABMiller

Global Compact

SCA

Sustainable Energy
for All

Schneider
Electric

Sustainable Energy
for All

Skanska AB

Sustainable Energy
for All

Renault,
Nissan

Global Compact

Rockefeller
Foundation

Sustainable Energy
for All

Siemens

93

Manufacture products that meet carbon footprint limits of 30% below product
average in 2014, 35% in 2015, 40% in 2020, 45% in 2025 and 50% in 2030

Provide universal access to solar energy in the Navajo Nation

By 2015, improve energy efficiency of product and solutions portfolio by 50%
(relative to 2009)

By 2020, replace 25% of petroleum-based materials with renewable materials
(relative to 2010), carry out 70% of washing machine loads using cold water,
and achieve 20% packaging reduction per consumer
Incorporate carbon management into long-term strategy

By 2016, have 1.5 million electric vehicles on roads; by 2012, have five different
electric vehicles available to consumers
By 2016, reduce energy consumption in all hotels by 25%

By 2014, commit to engage with initiatives to expand energy provision in
rural India: awarded US$ 6.3 million, may award an additional US$ 1 million

By 2020, reduce fossil fuel emissions from on-site energy use by 50% per
hectolitre of lager produced relative to 2008

By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and electricity and heating by
20% relative to 2005, triple production of biofuels from forests, and increase
production of wind power to 5 Twh
Increase number of people who receive Energy Savings Education

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2014, grow externally verified Environmental Portfolio from EU 29.9
billion to EU 40 billion

SKF

Sustainable Energy
for All

Sompo Japan
Insurance Inc.

Global Compact

By 2016, reduce total annual energy use by 5% below 2006 levels, require
that 100% of suppliers are certified under Energy Management Standard ISO
50001, reduce CO2 emissions/tonne-km for all transport by 30% below 2011
levels, and increase revenue from carbon-reducing/energy-saving portfolio to
10 billion SEK

Statoil ASA

Global Compact

Telefonica

Sustainable Energy
for All

In 2015, 50% of all commercial development projects started in Nordic markets
will meet “Deep Green” targets: 0 net use of primary energy, near 0 carbon
in construction, 0 unsustainable materials, and 0 net water use for buildings

By 2020, reduce CO2 emissions by 40.5%; by 2050, reduce CO2 emissions
by 56%

By 2020, reduce gas flaring to two tons of gas flared per 1000 tons of
hydrocarbons produced
By 2015, reduce energy consumption in networks per equivalent access by
30% (relative to 2007)
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Committer

Total

Toyola Energy
Limited
(Ghana)
Unilever
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Platform

Description

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2020, sell three million energy-efficient cooking stoves and 30,000 solar
lanterns and home systems to poor households in sub-Saharan Africa

Sustainable Energy
for All

Provide access to solar lamps and kits for five million low-income people by
2015

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2020, halve the environmental footprint of making and use of products

Sustainable Energy
for All

By 2015, procure 100% renewable electricity and 55% renewable energy

University of
Clinton Global
Texas at Austin Initiative

Pursue LEED certification on all new buildings

Xerox

By 2013, develop carbon management practices with different jurisdictions
in Indonesia; by 2014, identify priority opportunities for emissions reduction

Vestas

Global Compact

Prepared by Lydia Slobodian.
Sources: Clinton Global Initiative, http://www.clintonglobalinitiative.org; Natural Resources Defense Council,
Cloud of Commitments, http://www.cloudofcommitments.org; United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge
Platform, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org; UN Business, http://business.un.org/en/browse/commitments; Corporate
EcoForum and The Nature Conservancy, The New Business Imperative: Valuing Natural Capital (2012), available at http://
corporateecoforum.com/valuingnaturalcapital/; and Sustainable Energy for All, http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org.
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State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts:
Comments on Some ILC Articles
by Julio Barboza*

In 2001, after forty years of work, the International
Law Commission (ILC) produced excellent articles on
the international responsibility of States (herein, the
“ILC Articles”).1 These Articles were annexed to UN
General Assembly Resolution 56/83. The following paper
comments on Articles 1 and 2 and on others of the ILC
Articles as related to them. It is meant to be a contribution
from a former member of the Commission to the on-going
process of assimilation of the results of the ILC Articles
project into international practice.
Articles 1 and 2 should be examined together.
Other articles follow lines originated in the texts of
these two. Article 1 is a key, and sets a basic principle:
“every internationally wrongful act of a State entails
the international responsibility of that State”. Article 2
develops the all-important concept of “wrongful act” of
the State. Specifically, paragraph (a) defines an “act of the
State” and (b) sets out when an act of the State is “wrong”.
Classically, commentators note the omission of any
reference to “injury” or “damage” in the combined text
of Articles 1 and 2. That omission seems to indicate that
the ILC has taken sides in the old debate about whether
injury is necessary to give rise to responsibility. Around
the idea of continuing violation of an obligation (Article
14.2), other notions are grouped, including continued duty
of performance (Article 29) and cessation (Article 30). The
*
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and President of the International Law Commission, where he served as
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relationship between these three concepts is governed by an
internal logic seemingly at odds with the normal operation
of the responsibility mechanism.

The Mechanism of Responsibility

Referring to the normal operation of the responsibility
mechanism, i.e., the sequence from breach of primary
obligation to legal consequences, the mechanism is simple:
once the primary obligation is breached, it is forthwith
replaced by the secondary obligation (of reparation) and so
extinguished. But once extinguished it cannot be violated
any more, which undercuts the notion of continuing
violation. On the other hand, in a continuing violation,
the secondary obligations cannot enter into play until the
damage has been quantified, i.e., until the unlawful conduct
stops and consequently the damage to the injured State has
ceased and reparation, perhaps, been established.
The existence of continuing violations having already
been included in the ILC Articles at Article 14, it seemed
necessary that the primary obligation would need to remain
in force, if it were to continue being breached. In fact,
both the notions of continued duty of performance and
of cessation of violation are dependent on the concept of
continuing violation.
Thus, the mechanism of responsibility cannot work
in its usual way, i.e., by the immediate operation of the
obligation to make reparation. Cessation provides a new
starting point from which secondary obligations can enter
into play. Although different, however, the concepts of
continued duty of performance and cessation were given
the role of guardians of the sanctity of international
obligations. However, given that the Articles perceive
an identity between the roles played by cessation and
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